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Public Finance and the  
West Side Stadium 
THE FUTURE OF STADIUM SUBSIDIES IN NEW YORK 
INTRODUCTION 
The physical and economic landscape of New York City 
evolved on a grand scale during the more than 30 years that 
Robert Moses served as the State Parks Commissioner and as 
head of the Triborough Bridge and New York City Tunnel 
Authority.1  Moses employed many questionable financing 
schemes and consistently circumvented legislative and public 
review in order to build the bridges, parks, buildings, and 
highways that defined his career.2  The recently aborted plan to 
spend $2.2 billion to construct the New York Sports and 
Convention Center [hereinafter “West Side Stadium,” 
“Stadium,” or “NYSCC”]3 on the Far West Side of Manhattan 
resembled a Robert Moses project in several respects.4  First, 
  
 1 Robert Moses was the New York City Parks Commissioner from 1934-1960 
and headed the Triborough Bridge and New York City Tunnel Authority from 1948-
1968.  Over the course of his life, Moses served in several other municipal capacities 
and ran for public office.  See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1975) 
(biography of Robert Moses). 
 2 See id. at 16. 
 3 The stadium plan was rejected in June of 2005 when the New York State 
Public Authorities Control Board vetoed it by preventing New York State from allowing 
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to transfer the land upon which the 
stadium would be built and by withholding the requisite $300 million state subsidy.  
Charles V. Bagli, Bloomberg’s Stadium Quest Fails; Olympic Bid is Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 7, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Bloomberg’s Stadium Quest Fails]. 
 4 The general project plan describing the goals, anticipated uses, financing 
structure, and economic impacts of the NYSCC was adopted by the City and State of 
New York on November 4, 2004.  See NEW YORK STATE URBAN DEVELOPMENT D/B/A 
EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, GENERAL PROJECT PLAN:  NEW YORK 
SPORTS AND CONVENTION CENTER LAND USE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT & CIVIC PROJECT 
1 (2004), available at http://www.manhattancb4.org/HKHY/docs/Jets%20GPP.pdf 
[hereinafter GENERAL PROJECT PLAN].  See also Press Release, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg and Governor George Pataki, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg and Governor 
George E. Pataki Announce Historic Plan to Create Convention Corridor on 
Manhattan’s West Side, Including Expanded Javits Center and New 75,000 Seat 
Sports and Convention Center (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov 
[hereinafter Mayor’s Press Release] (follow “News and Press Releases” hyperlink under 
“Office of the Mayor”; then follow “2004 Events” hyperlink under “News and Press 
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the local and state governments attempted, through a complex 
financing structure, to avoid significant public review of this 
controversial plan.5  Second, the magnitude of this project 
called for a massive alteration to the city’s infrastructure that 
would have impacted a great deal more than the visual skyline 
of Manhattan.6  Finally, as was the case with Robert Moses’ 
projects, it may have taken a generation or more for the 
taxpayers of New York to fully pay for the incredible financial 
imposition that the stadium would have presented.7   
Few debates over public projects in recent years have 
caused such a fervent division of opinions amongst New York 
residents and lawmakers as the plan to construct the West 
Side Stadium.8  The proposal was part of the ambitious Hudson 
Yards Development Plan for the West Side of Manhattan: a 
development plan that called for dozens of new commercial and 
residential buildings, the extension of the Number 7 subway 
line, a renovated and expanded Jacob K. Javits Convention 
Center, extensive rezoning, new open spaces and parks, and 
the construction of a massive platform over the active Hudson 
Rail Yards.9  The proposed stadium would, most notably, have 
become the new home of the New York Jets football team.10  
The West Side Stadium was also intended to serve as an 
element of the northward extension of the Javits Convention 
Center,11 to lure mega-sports and entertainment events to New 
  
Releases”; then follow “March 2004” hyperlink under “2004”; then scroll down to 
“March 25, 2004” press releases and follow “Read the press release” hyperlink).   
 5 The lack of sufficient opportunities for public review of this plan is 
discussed infra Part III.B. 
 6 See Mayor’s Press Release, supra note 4.  
 7 See generally CARO, supra note 1.  For an in-depth discussion of the risks 
to taxpayer dollars associated with the West Side Stadium financing plan, see infra 
Part III.A. 
 8 See Charles V. Bagli, $11.5 Million Spent on Fight Over Stadium on West 
Side, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at B3.  
 9 New York City estimated that the entire Hudson Yards Development 
would cost about $3 billion excluding the cost of the New York Sports and Convention 
Center.  See Presentation of Hudson Yards Infrastructure Corporation Financing Plan 
to City Planning Commission (July 12, 2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/ 
hyards/financing_for_cpc.pdf [hereinafter Presentation of Hudson Yards Corporation 
Financing Plan].  Without the stadium, the future of the Hudson Yards development 
and the Javits Center are currently unknown.  See Charles V. Bagli, New Proposals 
Afoot for Javits Expansion and Now-Jetless Railyards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at B1.  
 10 GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 5. 
 11 On December 7, 2004, the New York State Assembly approved a bill to 
expand the Javits Center after language was removed that could have been read to 
approve the building of the West Side Stadium as part of that expansion.  This 
legislation allowed for the expansion of the Javits Center two city blocks to the north.  
See Press Release, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, Remarks by Speaker Sheldon 
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York such as the Super Bowl,12 and to provide the main stage 
for the coveted 2012 Summer Olympic Games.13   
Much of the rift in opinions over the West Side Stadium 
proposal was due to the fact that the plan required $600 
million in taxpayer funds to cover the construction of the 
stadium, which would have then become property of the Jets.14  
Although municipalities commonly finance sports facilities 
using public funds,15 this proposal represented what would 
have gone down in history as the largest public investment in 
the most expensive football stadium in the nation.16   
Now that the stadium is not being built, New York 
taxpayers have avoided paying the extraordinary costs of this 
project.  This victory for opponents of publicly subsidized 
stadiums, however, appears to be short lived as Major League 
Baseball’s (MLB) Yankees and Mets and the National 
Basketball Association’s (NBA) Nets are planning to build 
sports facilities that require large public investments as well.17   
Since municipalities began appropriating substantial 
amounts of public dollars for professional sports stadiums and 
arenas, these financing plans have been consistently met by 
  
Silver, Bill Signing: Javits Center Expansion (Dec. 8, 2004), available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20041208; Charles V. Bagli, Albany Votes to Expand 
Javits Center, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at B1.   
 12 GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.  See also Charles V. Bagli, 
Stadium Vote Linked to Olympics Bid and West Side’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
2004, at B1. 
 13 The International Olympic Committee ended New York’s chances of 
hosting the 2012 Summer Olympic Games when it chose London as the host city on 
July 6, 2005.  See International Olympic Committee website at http://www.olympic.org/ 
uk/games/london/election_uk.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 14 Presentation of Hudson Yards Corporation Financing Plan, supra note 9.  
See also Craig Horowitz, Stadium of Dreams, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 21, 2004, 
available at http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/realestate/ 
urbandev/features/9307/index.html.  For an in-depth discussion of the funding proposal 
for the stadium, see infra Part II.C. 
 15 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, “Build the Stadium – Create the 
Jobs!”, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND 
STADIUMS 2 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) [hereinafter SPORTS, JOBS & 
TAXES].  
 16 See Raymond J. Keating, Cato Inst., Sports Pork:  The Costly Relationship 
between Major League Sports and Government, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 399, Apr. 5, 1999, 
at 11-15.  For a summary of the costs and logistics of planned and recently completed 
professional football arenas compiled by a sports reform organization, see League of 
Fans: Summary of Current National Football League Stadium Deals at 
http://www.leagueoffans.org/nflstadiumdeals.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).  
 17 Charles V. Bagli, More Costs To Taxpayers Seen in Stadium Plans, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 1, at 27 [hereinafter More Costs To Taxpayers]; Charles V. 
Bagli, What the Team Wants And What the City Gets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 1, at 
31 [hereinafter What the Team Wants]. 
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taxpayer lawsuits challenging their legality under state 
constitutions.18  These lawsuits commonly attack the use of tax-
exempt bonds and other forms of public subsidy to fund the 
construction of stadiums, which bestow a great benefit to their 
owners while placing a massive risk-heavy debt upon the cities 
and states that fund them.19  The plan to build the West Side 
Stadium was defeated in the political arena before it faced 
similar legal challenges from New York residents.20  
Accordingly, New York courts never had the chance to rule 
definitively on whether the expenditure of hundreds of millions 
of public dollars for privately owned stadiums is permissible 
under the state constitution.   
In order to defeat the West Side Stadium plan on the 
grounds that the public subsidy was too great, opponents would 
have needed to overcome the national tendency of state courts 
to resolve suits brought against publicly funded stadiums in 
favor of the municipality.21  These opponents, however, will 
have the opportunity to challenge publicly financed stadiums in 
the near future as the Yankees, Mets, and Nets plan to build 
stadiums using New York taxpayer dollars.22  If the New York 
  
 18 In recent years, taxpayers and community groups have brought suits to 
enjoin the public financing of stadiums in many large cities such as Phoenix, Tampa, 
Chicago, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Milwaukee.  See Long v. 
Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 
672 (Fla. 1997); Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. 2003); 
Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 530 A.2d 245 (Md. 1987); Cohen v. City of 
Philadelphia, 806 A.2d 905 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Allegheny Inst. Taxpayers Coal. v. 
Allegheny Reg’l Asset Dist., 727 A.2d 113 (Pa. 1999); King County v. Taxpayers of King 
County, 949 P.2d 1260 (Wash. 1997); CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1996); 
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996).  For further 
discussion of the use of public funds to finance stadiums, see infra Part I. 
 19 See, e.g., CLEAN, 928 P.2d at 1054; Libertarian Party of Wisconsin, 546 
N.W.2d at 424.  
 20 On December 22, 2004, opponents of the proposed stadium filed suit 
against New York City in Supreme Court in Manhattan.  The suit alleged that the 
approval of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the project was based upon 
faulty and misleading information, not that the public expenditure was 
unconstitutional.  See Press Release, Hell’s Kitchen/Hudson Yards Alliance, Local 
Residents and Businesses File Suit Against MTA & New York City to Prevent 
Violation of State and City Environmental Laws and State’s Freedom of Information 
Law (Dec. 22, 2004) (on file with author).  See also Charles V. Bagli, 2 Groups Sue to 
Halt Action on Jets Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at B1.   
 21 State courts throughout the nation that have addressed this issue have 
rarely invalidated publicly financed stadium plans.  See, e.g., Poe, 695 So. 2d 672; 
Taxpayers of King County, 949 P.2d 1260; Libertarian Party of Wisconsin, 546 N.W.2d 
424.  But see Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 250 N.E.2d 547 
(Mass. 1969); Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966).  The history 
of taxpayer challenges to publicly financed stadiums will be discussed infra Part III.A. 
 22 See Bagli, More Costs To Taxpayers, supra note 17; Bagli, What the Team 
Wants, supra note 17.  The Jets have agreed with the New York Giants to jointly fund 
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courts hearing these taxpayer challenges carefully balance the 
risks and benefits of committing so much public money to 
privately owned stadiums, as the judiciary in Massachusetts 
does,23 these stadium funding plans should be held 
unconstitutional. 
This note will analyze the economic feasibility of the 
proposed plan to fund the construction of the West Side 
Stadium, the significant risks it posed, and the future of 
publicly subsidized stadiums in New York.  Part I will address 
the public financing of stadiums using tax-exempt bonds, 
federal attempts to curb the use of tax-exempt bonds for 
professional sports stadiums, and how payments in lieu of 
taxes represent another means of subsidizing stadium 
construction.  Part II will describe the logistics of the proposed 
West Side Stadium construction, including the financing 
mechanisms that the City and State planned to use and the 
story behind the ultimate demise of this stadium plan.   
Part III will analyze the significant risks and inequities 
particular to the West Side Stadium proposal.  First, the 
proponents of the stadium relied on a flawed financial study, 
which allowed them to announce unreasonably optimistic 
revenue predictions that were unlikely to occur.  Under more 
realistic figures New York was at risk of failing to meet the 
massive debt burden that it would have faced.24  Second, 
without significant public review of the plan to build the 
NYSCC and ample opportunities to explore alternative options 
for the West Side, this extremely valuable waterfront property 
may have become committed to a stadium that underutilized 
the area’s potential.  Finally, the social costs of committing vast 
amounts of public dollars to financing a stadium are 
exceedingly great at a time when New York City desperately 
needs additional funds for fire protection, education, public 
transportation, housing, and security. 
  
a football stadium in New Jersey to house both clubs.  It is unclear what the public 
costs of this project will be, but early signs indicate that the teams will not be asking 
the taxpayers of New Jersey to cover large portions of the stadium costs.  See Charles 
V. Bagli, Giants and Jets Agree to Share a New Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 30, 2005, at 
A1 [hereinafter Giants and Jets Agree]. 
 23 See Brian Adams, Note, Stadium Funding in Massachusetts: Has the 
Commonwealth Found the Balance in Private vs. Public Spending?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 
655, 671-75 (2002).  The Massachusetts approach to publicly financed stadiums will be 
discussed infra Part IV. 
 24 See NEW YORK CITY INDEPENDENT BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE STADIUM: 
TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY? 3-4 (July 1, 2004), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/newsfax/ 
insidethebudget131.pdf [hereinafter TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?]. 
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Many stadium financing schemes have withstood 
challenges in state courts under the public purpose doctrine: a 
doctrine that most states have adopted into their constitutions 
to prevent the public funding of projects that benefit private 
entities rather than the state and its citizens.25  Part IV will 
describe the evolution of the public purpose doctrine in relation 
to stadium financing and analyze its current effectiveness as a 
litigation tactic for opponents of publicly funded stadiums.  
Using the plan to finance the West Side Stadium as an 
example of how stadium funding plans provide massive private 
benefits to team owners that vastly overshadow the speculative 
benefits to the public, this Part will then demonstrate how such 
plans violate the public purpose doctrine.   
Part V will conclude this note by suggesting that 
although the taxpayers appeared to have won the fight against 
publicly financed stadiums when the NYSCC plan was 
defeated, the public is still at risk of being forced to help fund 
stadiums for the Yankees and Mets, and an arena in Brooklyn 
for the Nets.26  In fact, it may be the case that by asking for 
such a large amount of public money, the failed West Side 
Stadium plan has actually raised the bar, and future stadium 
proposals will ask for more public dollars than stadium 
developers requested before.  If this is the case, winning the 
recent fight against the West Side Stadium may only be the 
beginning of a long struggle to block the use of massive 
amounts of public dollars to fund privately owned stadiums.  
This note will conclude with the message that in future legal 
challenges to publicly funded stadiums, New York courts 
should send the message to wealthy sports franchises that they 
can no longer rely on New York taxpayer dollars to fund their 
playing fields.   
I. THE FUNDING OF STADIUMS USING TAX-EXEMPT BONDS, 
STADIUM AUTHORITIES, AND PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF 
TAXES 
Municipalities have been using taxpayer dollars to fund 
the construction of professional sports stadiums since the 
  
 25 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“The money of the state shall not be 
given or loaned to or in aid of any private corporation or association, or private 
undertaking; nor shall the credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of any 
individual, or public or private corporation or association, or private undertaking.”). 
 26 See Bagli, More Costs to Taxpayers, supra note 17. 
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1920s.27  Although some cities in the early twentieth century 
did utilize public funds to pay for stadium construction, the 
majority of stadiums in the United States at that time were 
privately built and owned by the team or teams that played 
there.28  Skyrocketing costs of construction, massive expansion 
of professional sports leagues, and perhaps most significantly, 
the threat of losing a team and its revenues to another city 
through relocation, have all contributed to the drastic shift 
towards the public subsidy of stadiums.29  Accordingly, since 
the 1960s, the United States has been experiencing a stadium 
construction boom,30 during which almost all major league 
sports teams have played in one or more stadiums that were 
constructed or renovated using taxpayer dollars.31 
A. The Use of Tax-Exempt Bonds to Finance Stadiums 
The predominant method for financing stadiums today 
is through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds.32  The proposal for 
  
 27 Cleveland’s Municipal Stadium, Baltimore’s Memorial Stadium, and the 
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum were built with public funds.  Noll & Zimbalist, supra 
note 15, at 2.  The Los Angeles and Cleveland stadiums were constructed after state 
courts rejected taxpayer lawsuits challenging the public expenditure.  See Los Angeles 
v. Dodge, 197 P. 403 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 
606 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930). 
 28 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 2 (“Publicly subsidized facilities for 
professional sports are hardly a new phenomenon . . . [b]ut, historically, publicly 
financed stadiums were exceptions to the rule.  Until about 1960, the vast majority of 
new facilities were privately owned, usually by one of the teams that played in them.”).  
Some historic examples of stadiums built and maintained with private funds include 
New York City’s Yankee Stadium, Chicago’s Wrigley Field, and Boston’s Fenway Park.  
See Zachary A. Phelps, Note, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing 
the Inequities Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 981, 983 
(2004). 
 29 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 3. 
 30 Daniel J. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing 
of Professional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1997). 
 31 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 3.  See also Lathrope, supra note 30, at 
1148-49; Alex Frangos, Bigger and Better: Pro Football Teams have Ambitious Plans for 
a New Generation of Stadiums; Here’s a Look at Their Chances for Success, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 20, 2004, at R4 (“Over the past 13 years of concrete pouring and turf laying, 25 
of the [NFL’s] 32 teams moved into new or gussied-up stadiums.”). 
 32 James L. Musselman, Recent Federal Income Tax Issues Regarding 
Professional and Amateur Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 196 (2003).  Other 
financing mechanisms that are often used to fund stadiums include lotteries, sales 
taxes, and levies on parking, hotels, alcohol, car rentals, and cigarettes.  Noll & 
Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 14; Lisa-Michele Smith, Note, History, Rivalry, Envy, and 
Relocation: Will the Sale of the New York Jets Give Rise to a New Stadium?, 7 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 309, 322 (2000); Scott A. Jensen, Note, Financing Professional Sports Facilities 
With Federal Tax Subsidies: Is it Sound Tax Policy?, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 425, 430-31 
(2000).  Since these mechanisms would not have been used directly to fund the 
construction of the West Side Stadium, they will not be discussed in this note. 
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the NYSCC was no exception.33  This type of financing involves 
the issuance of tax-exempt bonds by a municipality or state 
that will in turn be repaid using taxpayer dollars.  State and 
local governments prefer this method because it allows them to 
pay below-market interest rates, which bondholders are willing 
to accept because the interest on these bonds is exempt from 
federal taxation.34  This means that when a state or 
municipality issues a bond to fund the construction of a 
stadium, not only are the taxpayers of that state or 
municipality subsidizing the cost of construction by assuming 
the debt, but the federal government is subsidizing it as well by 
forfeiting tax revenues.35  Many proponents of publicly financed 
stadiums justify the policy of indirect subsidization by the 
federal government by claiming that the “‘benefits of [public 
capital facilities] extend beyond the jurisdiction that provides 
them,’ and will therefore, without the subsidy, be provided at 
less than the optimum level.”36  Many economists, however, 
claim that the economic benefits of stadiums to the jurisdiction 
are highly exaggerated, thus rendering the local and state 
subsidy justifications weak and the federal justification even 
weaker.37 
The federal government has attempted to curtail the 
indirect federal subsidy of professional sports facilities on 
several occasions, but the practice is occurring with as much 
frequency, if not more, than ever.38  One such attempt was the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which deemed a bond to be a “private 
activity bond,” and thus taxable, if more than ten percent of the 
bond proceeds are used by a nongovernmental entity and more 
  
 33 The financing structure for the NYSCC proposal will be discussed in depth 
infra Part II.C. 
 34 Musselman, supra note 32, at 196.  See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOSEPH 
BANKMAN & DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 184-85 (13th ed. 2003). 
 35 Musselman, supra note 32,  at 200. 
 36 Id. (quoting Lathrope, supra note 30, at 1159).  
 37 Lathrope, supra note 30, at 1159-60.  
Because the state and local economic benefits from a publicly owned sports 
facility are generally exaggerated, it is extremely difficult to justify the 
federal tax subsidy. . . .  Moreover, the economic justifications for the subsidy 
are even weaker from a federal perspective than from a state and local one.  
While increased spending at a sports facility may produce some local 
economic activity, there will be very little new, net, national economic 
activity generated by a publicly owned sports facility. 
Id.  See also Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiums: Who Benefits, Who Pays?, in 
SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES 119, supra note 15, at 133 (“[T]o the federal taxpayer, very few 
economic benefits are created to offset the cost of the subsidy. . . .”). 
 38 Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 137. 
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than ten percent of the debt service is secured by property used 
in a private business.39  This law has been interpreted to mean 
that a government bond issue may exceed “one but not both of 
the 10 percent bond tests.”40  Owners of recently constructed 
stadiums have circumvented the requirements of the second 
ten percent test by servicing at least ninety percent of the debt 
using non-stadium revenues.41  By repaying their debts in this 
manner, less than ten percent of the bonds are secured by the 
private business that is occupying the stadium and the bond 
cannot be considered a private activity bond for tax purposes.42   
So called “stadium authorities” are another way for 
municipalities to avoid “private activity bond” status and 
maintain federal tax exemptions.43  This is possible because a 
tax is not considered to be stadium related if it is “generally 
applicable.”44  By establishing an authority as a separate unit 
of the state government that manages several stadiums, the 
taxes on event tickets are generally applicable as long as they 
are applied to all events equally.  This allows stadium 
authorities to circumvent the ten percent of stadium debt 
service requirement of the Internal Revenue Code by servicing 
their debts with tax proceeds from ticket sales that are not 
considered to be stadium related.45 
B. Congressional Efforts to Limit the Use of Tax-Exempt 
Bonds for Stadiums 
In an effort to curb the issuance of local tax-exempt 
bonds to finance stadiums, Senator Daniel Moynihan 
introduced the Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act 
(STADIA)46 in 1996, 1997, and 2000.47  This bill proposed an 
  
 39 I.R.C. § 141 (2000); Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 136. 
 40 Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 137.  See also Lathrope, supra note 30, at 
1156-57. 
 41 Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 137. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 138. 
 44 The applicable Tax Code provision entitled “Exception for tax assessment, 
etc., loans” provides, “a loan is described in this paragraph if such loan-- (A) enables 
the borrower to finance any governmental tax or assessment of general application for 
a specific essential governmental function . . . .”  I.R.C. § 141(c)(2) (2000). 
 45 Zimmerman, supra note 37, at 138.  A stadium authority was created in 
Maryland for the purpose of avoiding “private activity bond” status in connection with 
the bonds issued for the construction of Camden Yards, where MLB’s Baltimore Orioles 
currently play their home games.  See id.; Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 530 
A.2d 245, 246 (Md. 1987). 
 46 S. 1880, 104th Cong. (1996).   
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amendment to section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code48 that 
would define a private activity bond (one that does not qualify 
for federal tax exemption) as “any bond issued as part of an 
issue if the amount of the proceeds of the issue which are to be 
used (directly or indirectly) to provide professional sports 
facilities exceeds the lesser of-- (A) 5 percent of such proceeds, 
or (B) $5,000,000.”49  This bill addressed several concerns.  
First, by allowing local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds 
to finance stadiums, wealthy franchise owners were the true 
beneficiaries, not the municipality.50  Second, Senator 
Moynihan and the other supporters of this bill also feared the 
tendency of municipalities spending beyond their means when 
issuing debt to pay for sports facilities.51  Finally, the 
proponents of this bill did not believe Congress intended to 
create this loophole allowing for the use of tax-free bonds to pay 
for stadiums that benefit private organizations when it enacted 
section 141 of the Internal Revenue Code.52  Although Senator 
Moynihan’s concerns were valid, as the following analysis of 
the plan to finance the West Side Stadium will illustrate, 
Congress did not enact this stadium reform.53 
In 1996, Senators Mike Dewine and John Glen 
introduced the Team Relocation Taxpayer Protection Act.54  
This bill would have denied federal tax benefits associated with 
the relocation of a National Football League (NFL) franchise if 
the franchise broke an unexpired lease with a publicly owned 
facility.55  This bill only applied when:  (1) the team was 
relocating to a publicly owned facility; (2) the team’s average 
attendance was at least seventy-five percent of stadium 
capacity; and (3) the voters of the team’s jurisdiction approved 
  
 47 Musselman, supra note 32, at 201; 146 CONG. REC. S9257-02 (daily ed. 
Sept. 26, 2000).  
 48 I.R.C. § 141.  For a discussion of section 141, see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & 
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS, §§ 15.2.1- 
15.3.2 (3d ed. 1999). 
 49 S. 1880, § 2.  
 50 Phelps, supra note 28, at 996.  See also Michael D. Erickson, Note, Upon 
Further Review…When it Comes to Tax-Exempt, Stadium Finance Reform, Stop 
Cheering for the Popular Proposals and Adopt Simple Reform, 21 VA. TAX REV. 603, 
615-16 (2002).  
 51 Phelps, supra note 28, at 996.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Musselman, supra note 32, at 201. 
 54 S. 1529, 104th Cong. (1996). 
 55 Id., § 2. 
2005] PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE WEST SIDE STADIUM 487 
taxes to improve the existing facilities or build new facilities.56  
This bill also failed to pass.57  
Shortly after these bills were defeated, Senator Arlen 
Specter introduced the Stadium Financing and Franchise 
Relocation Act of 1999, which was another attempt at reducing 
the public costs of professional sports facility construction.58  
This act would have limited the cost to the public by forcing 
MLB and the NFL to create a trust fund from which part of the 
stadium construction costs would be paid,59 as well as 
drastically limit a franchise’s ability to relocate.60  This 
legislation was also not enacted by Congress.61   
Although STADIA, the Team Relocation Taxpayer 
Protection Act, and the Stadium Financing and Franchise 
Relocation Act all failed to become federal law,62 they do 
demonstrate that members of Congress are deeply concerned 
that federal tax exemptions for stadium construction represent 
an inequity to local and federal taxpayers.  Notwithstanding 
these congressional efforts to deter teams from seeking public 
subsidy of stadiums through tax-exempt bonds, the practice 
pervades today.63   
C. Payments in Lieu of Taxes as a Form of Local Subsidy 
Some states, including New York, use payments in lieu 
of taxes (PILOTs) as an additional method of financing stadium 
construction.64  PILOTs are, as defined by the laws of New 
York, “any payment made to an agency, or affected tax 
  
 56 Id.  See also Musselman, supra note 32, at 201-02. 
 57 Musselman, supra note 32, at 202. 
 58 S. 952, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 59 Id., § 1(b). 
 60 Id., § 1(a)(2)(C).  
 61 Phelps, supra note 28, at 1003. 
 62 Senator Specter and others attribute this failure to the strong lobbying 
efforts of the professional sports leagues.  Phelps, supra note 28, at 1002 (citing 145 
CONG. REC. 4674 and Martin J. Greenberg, Stadium Financing and Franchise 
Relocation Act of 1999, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 383, 398 (2000)).  The Government 
Finance Officers Association also opposed these Congressional actions because they 
appeared to preempt local and state governments from making financing decisions 
affecting their jurisdictions.  Practicing Law Institute, Government Finance Officers 
Association (GFOA) Fact Sheet: Sports Facilities Bonds (1998).  
 63 The plan to construct the West Side Stadium involved the issuance of these 
tax-exempt bonds.  See GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
 64 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 696 (McKinney 2005).  The plan to finance the 
West Side Stadium included the use of PILOTs.  See GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra 
note 4, at 7.  For a more detailed description of the plan to finance the NYSCC, see 
infra Part II.C. 
488 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
jurisdiction equal to the amount, or a portion of, real property 
taxes, or other taxes, which would have been levied by or on 
behalf of an affected tax jurisdiction if the project was not tax 
exempt by reason of agency involvement.”65  This means that 
private contributions to the cost of the stadium may be paid to 
the municipality in amounts equal to the property taxes that 
would have been due to that municipality.  PILOTs become a 
form of local subsidy when a municipality lends capital in the 
form of municipal bonds to the private developer in order to 
cover the private share of the stadium construction costs.66  
This is because the municipality is forfeiting its right to receive 
property taxes in exchange for payments that merely service 
the debt owed to it by the private entity. 
The NYSCC proposal called for the issuance of at least 
$600 million in tax-exempt bonds and the use of PILOTs by the 
Jets.67  The next part will describe what that massive 
investment would have went towards if the West Side Stadium 
had been built.  
II. THE PLAN TO FUND AND CONSTRUCT THE NYSCC 
The stadium boom that has resulted in the construction 
of new publicly subsidized sports facilities throughout the 
nation has reached New York City in a huge way.68  Under 
Rudolph Giuliani’s mayoral administration, there was 
discussion about building a stadium on the West Side to lure 
the Jets to New York, but that plan never came to fruition.69  In 
March of 2004, the City and State of New York, in conjunction 
with the New York Jets, announced plans to construct a $1.4 
billion retractable roof stadium and convention center on the 
  
 65 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 854(17) (McKinney 2005). 
 66 New York City planned to issue bonds to the Jets and accept payments in 
lieu of taxes to service the bond debt.  GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 7.  The 
use of PILOTs for financing the West Side Stadium will be further discussed infra Part 
II.C. 
 67 See infra Part II.C. 
 68 The NFL’s Jets are only one of the New York Metropolitan Area’s nine 
professional sports teams that are seeking new or substantially renovated playing 
facilities.  The owners of the NFL’s Giants, MLB’s Yankees and Mets, the National 
Hockey League’s Islanders, Devils, and Rangers, and the NBA’s Knicks and Nets are 
all currently planning to upgrade their team’s home.  Keating, supra note 16, at 16; 
Jets and Giants Agree, supra note 22. 
 69 See Smith, supra note 32, at 326; Dan Barry, Giuliani Offers Plan to Put 
Up Sports Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at A1. 
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Far West Side of Manhattan.70  That announcement polarized 
local residents and politicians and initiated a battle over the 
future of the Far West Side that was waged in the media, in 
City Hall, and on the city’s streets.71 
The proponents of the stadium plan included Michael 
Bloomberg, mayor of New York City, George Pataki, governor 
of New York, unions representing the food service, hotel, and 
construction industries, and the organizations trying to bring 
the Olympic Games to New York.72  Those who supported the 
plan pointed to the jobs that would have been created by the 
construction and operation of the West Side Stadium and the 
revenues that would have been generated from stadium events 
as exceeding the risks of allocating $600 million in public 
dollars.73  In his announcement of the plan, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg said that the NYSCC would “enable . . . New York 
City to vie for hundreds of events – and millions of dollars in 
economic activity – now lost to other cities” as well as “create 
hundreds of thousands of jobs in construction, tourism and new 
businesses, large and small.”74  These statements are typical of 
those made throughout the nation by politicians in 
municipalities seeking to justify the construction of a 
stadium.75 
Opponents of the stadium included community 
organizations such as the Hell’s Kitchen/Hudson Yards 
Alliance76 and the Citizens Union,77 Community Board 4, which 
represents that area,78 several elected officials,79 owners of 
  
 70 Associated Press, New York Proposes New Stadium Complex, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 26, 2004, at B2.   
 71 See, e.g., Bagli, supra note 8 (“The debate over a proposed $1.4 billion 
football stadium project for the Jets has entered the financial stratosphere, with 
proponents and opponents spending a combined $11.5 million on television advertising, 
and on lobbyists, T-shirts, buttons, leaflets and CD’s, according to a report issued 
yesterday by Common Cause.”); Charles V. Bagli, Some Heavy Artillery is Aimed at the 
West Side Stadium Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2004, at B7; Jennifer Steinhauer, On 
One Side, Cheerleading; the Other, ‘Block That Stadium!’, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at 
B1. 
 72 See Mayor’s Press Release, supra note 4; Steinhauer, supra note 71.  
 73 Mayor’s Press Release, supra note 4. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 15, at 1-2. 
 76 See Charles V. Bagli, Build Platform, Group Says, but Please Hold the 
Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at B4. 
 77 See Charles V. Bagli, Citizens Union Urges City to Rethink Stadium Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2004, at B6. 
 78 Letter from Manhattan Community Board No. 4 to the Chair of the City 
Planning Commission (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.manhattanCB4.org (last 
visited Sep. 1, 2005). 
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theaters in the nearby theater district,80 the Regional Plan 
Association,81 as well as Cablevision, the owner of Madison 
Square Garden.82  The reasons given by these groups for 
opposing the stadium included the economic risk to the City’s 
budget from such an immense public outlay, the need to use 
tax dollars for more pressing social concerns such as schools, 
security, and housing, and the traffic and noise that the 
stadium would create.83   
A. Unsatisfied with Their Current Home Field in New 
Jersey, the Jets are Looking to Build a New Home 
Before discussing this hotly contested stadium proposal, 
it is helpful to understand why the Jets were so eager to leave 
their current home in New Jersey and why many New York 
politicians were eager to lure them to the West Side.84  
Organized as the New York Titans in 1959, early in their 
history, the Jets played their home games at the Polo Grounds 
in upper Manhattan (1961-1963) and Shea Stadium in Queens 
(1964-1983).85  In 1984, the team announced that they were 
moving into Giants Stadium at the Meadowlands, the home of 
the other New York Metropolitan NFL franchise.86  Although 
the Jets ownership insisted that they would return to New 
York City when a “first-class professional stadium was ready 
  
 79 See Jefferson Siegel, Miller, Quinn Team Up On 23rd to Oppose a West Side 
Stadium, THE VILLAGER, Apr. 13-19, 2005, http://www.thevillager.com/ 
villager_102/millerquinnteamupon23.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).   
 80 Charles V. Bagli, Broadway Joins Criticism of West Side Stadium Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at B3. 
 81 The Regional Plan Association (RPA) is an independent, not-for-profit 
regional planning organization that seeks to improve the economic competitiveness of 
the New York-New Jersey-Connecticut region through research, planning, and 
advocacy.  For more information, see the RPA homepage, http://www.rpa.org.   
 82 Cablevision spent millions in a television campaign against the stadium 
and brought several lawsuits to block construction of this stadium.  See Bagli, supra 
note 8; In re Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 104644/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2005), 
aff’d, 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).  For more discussion of this 
dispute, see infra Part III.A. 
 83 Charles V. Bagli, Stadium Opponents Criticize City for Adopting Jets’ 
Economic Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, § 1, at 25; Letter from Manhattan 
Community Board No. 4, supra note 78. 
 84 The Jets currently plan to stay in New Jersey, but no longer as tenants in 
another team’s stadium.  See Giants and Jets Agree, supra note 22. 
 85 See The New York Jets Historical Highlights, http://www.newyorkjets.com/ 
history (last visited Sep. 1, 2005). 
 86 Id. 
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for occupancy,” the team is currently still playing their home 
games in Giants Stadium in New Jersey.87 
The Jets current home field situation is considered by 
many as one of the worst stadium deals in the NFL.88  Although 
the team consistently sells out its home games, the Jets 
generate less-than-optimal revenues.  The reason for this is the 
rent the Jets annually pay to the Meadowlands and 
unfavorable concessions, parking, and luxury box contracts.89  
The Jets have been desperate to have a stadium of their own 
since the 1980s and were pushing as hard as they could for a 
stadium that would be ready for use by 2009, since their lease 
with the Meadowlands expired at the end of the 2008 football 
season.90  These timing concerns did not allow the proponents 
of this plan much time to obtain approval for the stadium.91   
B. The NYSCC and the Large-Scale Development of the 
West Side 
The Jets joined forces with the Mayor’s office, the 
organizations attempting to bring the Olympic Games to New 
York, and several unions in order to push for the construction 
of the NYSCC.  The 75,000-seat retractable-roof-stadium was 
designed by architect Kohn Pederson Fox and was presented to 
the public as part of the immense Hudson Yards development 
plan.92  The West Side Stadium would also have been fully 
convertible into an 180,000 square foot exhibit hall for 
conventions and trade shows by removing the field surface and 
  
 87 Smith, supra note 32, at 317-18.  
 88 Id. at 323 (citing JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT: THE 
BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 152 (1992)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND CITY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW YORK, NO. 7 SUBWAY EXTENSION-HUDSON YARDS REZONING 
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM DRAFT GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2-
48 (2004) [hereinafter DGEIS], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ 
hyards/eis.html.  The expiration of the Jets’ lease is no longer an issue since the Jets 
and Giants have agreed to jointly finance and construct a new stadium for use by both 
teams.  See Jets and Giants Agree, supra note 22. 
 91 Anticipating litigation, the drafters of legislation that would have allowed 
for the construction of the NYSCC as part of the Javits Center expansion wrote in 
provisions that would expedite judicial review of the plan by forcing plaintiffs to bring 
suit in the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court rather than the 
Supreme Court (the state trial court in New York).  REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, 
FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF MANHATTAN’S FAR WEST SIDE: A REGIONAL PLAN 
ASSOCIATION POSITION PAPER 32 (2004), available at http://www.rpa.org/pdf/ 
FWSpositionpaper.pdf [hereinafter REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION]. 
 92 Frangos, supra note 31.   
492 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
retracting the seats closest to the field.93  The Stadium as 
planned would have occupied approximately 2.5 million gross 
square feet between Eleventh and Twelfth Avenues from West 
30th to West 33rd Street.94  While the proponents of this plan put 
forth great effort to frame this project as a multi-use facility 
that would have been occupied year-round by conventions, 
concerts, and other events, the only tenant that would 
definitely have occupied the NYSCC was the New York Jets for 
the minimum ten home games they play each season.95   
Many view the Far West Side as the “last great frontier” 
in Manhattan when it comes to areas where there has been 
practically no new commercial or residential development.96  
The site upon which the stadium would have been built is 
currently occupied by exposed rail yards [hereinafter “John D. 
Caemmerer West Side Yards,” “Hudson Rail Yards,” or “Rail 
Yards”] used by the Long Island Rail Road and owned by the 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, both of which are 
affiliates of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA).97  The proponents of the West Side Stadium and the 
Hudson Yards development plan referred to this section of the 
city as “blighted,” “substandard,” and “unsanitary.”98  While not 
in agreement that the area is “blighted,” “substandard,” and 
“unsanitary,” even the various opponents of the stadium plan 
agreed that substantial development of the West Side is in the 
best interests of New York City.99  Within the next few years 
construction will begin in this underutilized section of 
Manhattan.  The crucial question is:  what type of development 
would provide the greatest public benefit? 
Developers and politicians sought to take advantage of 
this “last great frontier” with a massive Hudson Yards 
development plan, of which the West Side Stadium was an 
included but independent part.100  This plan called for a city 
  
 93 DGEIS, supra note 90, at ES-17.  
 94 Id.  
 95 See Horowitz, supra note 14.  The Jets play 8 regular season games, 2 pre-
season games, and if applicable, playoff games at its home field. 
 96 Id. at 2. 
 97 GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 98 Id. at 9. 
 99 See REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 3. 
 100 See GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.  
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investment of over $3 billion (in 2003 dollars)101 to create 28 
million square feet of new commercial office space, 12,600 
residential units, and significant amounts of open recreational 
space on the Far West Side of Manhattan.102  The development 
plan also included the extension of the Number 7 subway line, 
the construction of a massive steel and concrete platform over 
the active rail yards, a 1,500 room convention hotel, the 
expansion of the Jacob K. Javits Center, and a convention 
corridor connecting the Javits Center to the NYSCC.103 
The overarching Hudson Yards plan was contingent 
upon several factors.  First, the city and state legislatures had 
to approve the funding and construction of the platform upon 
which the development would occur.  Second, the New York 
City Council had to approve the rezoning of a large section of 
western Manhattan to allow for high density development in 
the area.104  Third, some public review was necessary whereby 
the local community would have been given an opportunity to 
voice their opinions on the plan.105  Finally, the City needed to 
successfully negotiate with the MTA for the air rights to build 
the platform above the John D. Caemmerer West Side Yards.106  
While the opponents of this plan attacked nearly every aspect 
of this plan as being the wrong type of development for the 
City, the inclusion of a publicly subsidized stadium that would 
house the Jets was met by the most vociferous criticism. 
C. The Plan to Finance the NYSCC 
If built, the total cost of the NYSCC would have been 
more than $1.4 billion, by far the most expensive multi-use 
stadium in the country.107  Those attacking the plan focused 
upon the immense public contribution that was necessary to 
build this project while supporters focused on the 
  
 101 NEW YORK CITY INDEPENDENT BUDGET OFFICE, WEST SIDE FINANCING’S 
COMPLEX $1.3 BILLION STORY 1 (2004), available at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/ 
iboreports/westsidefinanceFB.pdf.   
 102 DGEIS, supra note 90, at ES-1. 
 103 Id. at ES-2. 
 104 The proposed rezoning is described in detail in chapter 4 of the DGEIS.  Id.  
 105 This procedure is called the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure 
(ULURP).  For a description of the ULURP process, see New York City Department of 
City Planning, The Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/ 
dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 106 Horowitz, supra note 14, at 7.  The issue of the air rights negotiations will 
be discussed infra Part III.A. 
 107 See Keating, supra note 16, at 11-14. 
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unprecedented private investment that the Jets planned to 
contribute.108  Regardless of which view is taken, it is 
indisputable that the West Side Stadium project was 
unmatched in cost and would have represented a sizable 
concern of the city’s economy.  
The New York Jets intended to spend $800 million to 
spur construction of their new home field, the largest ever 
private investment in an NFL stadium.109  This private 
investment was to go towards the actual stadium that would lie 
atop the publicly funded platform.110  The Jets also assured the 
city that the team would protect the public by covering any cost 
overruns.111  The team planned on signing a forty-nine-year 
lease for use of the land, but for its extensive investment, it 
would have been the owner of the building and collected the 
revenues from its operation.112  There was much criticism, 
however, over the fact that the city planed to assist the Jets by 
issuing $400 million in tax-exempt “Jets bonds” to be repaid 
with payments in lieu of taxes by the Jets.113  This meant that 
the stadium would be exempt from municipal property taxes, 
and that the Jets would pay back its debt to the city in 
“[amounts that did] not exceed real estate taxes that would 
otherwise be payable.”114  Opponents criticized this private 
financing scheme as “the Jets . . . effectively paying back the 
city with the city’s money.”115 
In order to cover the staggering costs of the NYSCC, 
$600 million more in public subsidies were still needed in 
addition to the Jets’ contribution.  New York City announced 
  
 108 Press Release, Hell’s Kitchen/Hudson Yards Alliance, Public Cost of Jets 
Stadium Higher than Reported? (July 16, 2004) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.newyorkgames.org/news/archives/001951.html. 
 109 Mayor’s Press Release (March 25, 2004), supra note 4.  In regards to this 
massive outlay of funds, Jets owner Woody Johnson said, “[t]he Jets are proud to invest 
$800 million in the future of our city to create the greatest sports and convention 
center in the world.  And we thank New York City and State for committing the 
resources to make that investment possible.”  Id. 
 110 COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, HOW 
WILL THE WEST SIDE STADIUM COMPLEX IMPACT OUR CITY? (2004) [hereinafter HOW 
WILL THE WEST SIDE STADIUM IMPACT OUR CITY?], available at 
http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/61636.htm?CFID=805016&CFTOKEN=987
76719 (outlining the uses of the private state and city investments).   
 111 Mayor’s Press Release (March 25, 2004), supra note 4. 
 112 Horowitz, supra note 14. 
 113 GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
 114 Id. at 7. 
 115 Press Release, Hells Kitchen/Hudson Yards Alliance, Public Cost of Jets 
Stadium Higher than Reported! (Dec. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.newyorkgames.org/news/archives/003158.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).   
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that it would provide $300 million:  $225 million to cover the 
cost of the retractable roof and $75 million towards the 
platform over the rail yards.116  The $300 million investment in 
the NYSCC would have been generated through the issuance of 
tax-exempt bonds.117  The City expected that the construction of 
the NYSCC and the accompanying jobs would “generate 
billions in incremental personal income, sales, and other taxes 
that will flow directly to the City, State and MTA.”118  The 
economic allure of the possibility of bringing the 2012 Summer 
Olympic Games, the Super Bowl, and other mega-events were 
also strong factors in the City’s willingness to support this 
project with such a sizeable contribution.119  These funds were 
in addition to the projected $3 billion necessary for the 
construction of the other components of the Hudson Yards 
development.120  
The remaining $300 million needed for the West Side 
Stadium was sought from the New York State budget.121  The 
state’s investment would have covered the remaining cost of 
the platform over the rail yards, estimated to cost $375 
million.122  All of these figures added up to the glaring fact that 
politicians in the City and State of New York intended to issue 
hundreds of millions of dollars in debt to lure sporting events, 
large-scale conventions, and tourism to the City, and of course, 
the tax dollars that follow. 
D. The Demise of the West Side Stadium 
The Jets’ hopes for building the largest football stadium 
in the country on the West Side of Manhattan were destroyed 
by two state legislators unconvinced that a stadium would 
benefit the citizens of New York.  In the summer of 2005, the 
New York State Public Authorities Control Board (PACB), a 
  
 116 HOW WILL THE WEST SIDE STADIUM IMPACT OUR CITY?, supra note 110. 
 117 Horowitz, supra note 14. 
 118 Presentation of Hudson Yards Corporation Financing Plan, supra note 9. 
 119 See GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 1; Horowitz, supra note 14. 
 120 See GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 121 Presentation of Hudson Yards Corporation Financing Plan, supra note 9. 
 122 HOW WILL THE WEST SIDE STADIUM IMPACT OUR CITY?, supra note 110.  
New York State also sought to restructure the bonds on the current Javits Convention 
Center in order to free up another $350 million for expansion of the Javits Center.  See 
Press Release, New York State Govenor George E. Pataki, Governor Pataki Proposes 
Bill to Expand Javits Center (June 3, 2004), http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/ 
04/june3_04.htm.  A hotel room tax was proposed to generate the necessary funds to 
cover the debt from the Javits Center.  Id. 
496 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1 
little-known yet extraordinarily powerful state board, faced the 
decision of whether it should approve the $300 million state 
subsidy required to construct the West Side Stadium.123  This 
board, created in 1976 to manage ballooning public authority 
debts,124 consists of three voting members, Governor George 
Pataki, State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, and State 
Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno.125  The PACB must 
unanimously approve the financing and construction of any 
project proposed by various state public benefit corporations.126  
The New York State Urban Development Corporation, the 
authority that was going to finance the West Side Stadium127 
fell under the purview of the PACB.128  Since Governor Pataki 
was a staunch supporter of the stadium, the fate of this project 
was in the hands of Assemblyman Silver and Senator Bruno, 
who each possessed the power to prevent the state from 
subsidizing the stadium by voting against the plan. 
In late May and early June of 2005, the proponents of 
the West Side Stadium attempted to convince the members of 
the PACB that the stadium and its $300 million state subsidy 
price tag would ultimately benefit New York.  Despite a great 
deal of behind the scenes maneuvering on the part of the Jets 
and Mayor Bloomberg’s administration, on June 6, 2005, 
Assemblyman Silver and Senator Bruno vetoed the plan to 
build the West Side Stadium.129  Senator Bruno, who represents 
a district in upstate New York, expressed skepticism that there 
was justification for such a huge subsidy when so many New 
Yorkers opposed the plan.130  Speaker Silver, who represents a 
district in Downtown Manhattan, declined to support the plan 
because it would have involved the construction of 24 million 
square feet of new office space in Midtown that would have 
competed with Lower Manhattan for tenants.131  Regardless of 
the reasons why, these powerful legislators used their veto 
  
 123 Michael Cooper & Charles V. Bagli, Bruno and Silver Continue to Express 
Doubts on Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at B5. 
 124 See New York State Office of the State Comptroller, What is the Public 
Authorities Control Board?, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/pubauth/whatisboard.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2005).  
 125 Cooper, supra note 123. 
 126 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 50(2), 51(1) (McKinney 2005).  
 127 DGEIS supra note 90, at ES-1-2. 
 128 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 51(1)(e) (McKinney 2005). 
 129 Bloomberg’s Stadium Quest Fails, supra note 3. 
 130 See Cooper, supra note 123. 
 131 Id. 
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power to bring the possibility of a West Side Stadium to a 
screeching halt and left the Jets and Olympic planners to 
quickly revise their plans.132  Now that the evolution and 
ultimate demise of the plan to build the NYSCC are clear, the 
next section will address the considerable risks and inequities 
that were avoided when this controversial proposal fell apart. 
III. THE RISKS OF THE WEST SIDE STADIUM PLAN 
As is often the case when American cities seek to justify 
large public investments in the construction of sports facilities 
and convention centers, supporters of this proposal contended 
that the facility would pay for itself.133  The optimistic 
projections of this plan, however, were called into question by 
several independent and reputable organizations.134  These 
organizations argued that the huge economic risks of such a 
large outlay of public dollars were too great.135  Additionally, 
the state and local legislatures had little power to approve the 
plan or consider alternatives, and the citizens whose taxes 
were to be spent had no opportunity to vote on this important 
public decision. 
A. The Projected Benefits of the NYSCC Were Founded 
upon Inflated Figures   
New York City’s estimates of the potential revenues of 
the West Side Stadium were based on a study done by Ernst & 
Young for the Jets,136 which the City accepted without 
  
 132 See Chales V. Bagli, Plan for Stadium in Queens Shapes Up Political 
Lineup, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B3; Charles V. Bagli, Jets Cling to Dream of 
Stadium on West Side, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at B3; Charles V. Bagli & Mike 
McIntire, Taxpayer Expense is Less in Deal for New Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 
2005, at B4. 
 133 See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports 
Teams and Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES 55, supra note 15, at 58. 
 134 See TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24; NEW YORK CITY 
INDEPENDENT BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF 
THE NEW YORK SPORTS AND CONVENTION CENTER, (July 2004), http://www.ibo.nyc. 
ny.us/iboreports/stadiumBP.pdf [hereinafter ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL 
IMPACTS]; REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91. 
 135 See, e.g., TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24; REGIONAL PLAN 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 91. 
 136 Ernst & Young, Preliminary Estimates of the Economic and Fiscal Impacts 
of a Proposed Multi-Use Athletic and Exhibition Facility, Hudson Yards District, New 
York City (April 2004) [hereinafter the Jets’ study]. 
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performing its own study.137  To justify the cost of the stadium 
to the public, the Jets and New York presented this study as 
fact when it was unlikely that the facility, if built, would 
actually generate the amount of revenue projected.138  This 
study reported that the NYSCC would generate $72 million in 
new tax revenues each year of operation – more than enough to 
cover the $42 million in annual debt service over thirty years.139  
These figures assumed that the stadium would host many more 
events than appeared feasible and that those events would 
draw more people than similar ones in other markets.140  The 
bottom line is that the only events that would definitely occur if 
the stadium was built were ten annual New York Jets football 
games.  Proponents of the NYSCC claimed that the stadium 
would frequently be used in its non-stadium, “convention” 
setup.141  However, if it turned out that the stadium was not 
used as often as the City and the Jets claimed it would be, the 
loss would have fallen upon the taxpayers not the Jets. 
According to the New York City Independent Budget 
Office (IBO), “[t]he Jets and the Bloomberg Administration 
have publicly acknowledged that if the new facility were 
operated only as a football stadium, it would not generate 
sufficient tax revenue to justify the public investment.”142  The 
Jets, on the other hand, would break even on their $800 million 
investment solely from their football games.143  Since the Jets 
would have been the owners of the stadium, the team would 
have been under no obligation to continue to operate it as a 
convention center if that business turned out to be 
unprofitable, as has been the case in other large cities with 
comparable facilities.144  This realistic scenario would have left 
the taxpayers of New York to supply however much of the $42 
  
 137 Charles V. Bagli, Big Claims And Questions Surround Plan For a 
Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, at 29. 
 138 See TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 1. 
 139 Horowitz, supra note 14.  The plan provided that the City and State of New 
York would each have annual debt services of $21 million and the Jets projected that 
there will be $36.2 million in city and $36.3 million in state tax revenues annually.  
TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 1 n.1. 
 140 See TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 2. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. at 3. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at 3-4.  See also Horowitz, supra note 14 (“[the City proponents] say the 
Jets will be mandated to use the building for convention-style events a significant 
number of days a year.  [The Jets have] a different idea: ‘We’ll let the market 
determine what works in terms of use of the building.’”). 
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million in annual debt service that could not be covered by tax 
revenues from convention operations. 
Independent analysis of the proponents’ projections 
revealed that the estimated revenue of $72 million was a 
significant overstatement.145  The Jets’ study projected that the 
West Side Stadium would be used for thirty-eight conventions, 
trade and consumer shows that would attract 8,427 attendees 
per show.146  Many critical aspects of the Jets’ study, however, 
were dramatically flawed.  The report claimed that these 
figures were reached using data from “comparable venues,” but 
it failed to provide detailed enough information regarding these 
“venues” that would warrant such optimistic predictions.147  
Second, high costs for exhibitioners and visitors in New York 
City would have negatively impacted NYSCC’s attractiveness 
as a convention location.148  Additionally, the overlap of the 
NFL season with prime fall convention season would have cut 
into the NYSCC’s availability to hold weekend shows during 
the busy season as well as deterred scheduling of weekend 
shows years in advance, when the future NFL schedule is 
unknown.149 
Convention center studies have shown that cities 
consistently present optimistic and unlikely figures to justify 
large public expenditures for convention centers that end up 
failing to meet expectations once constructed.150  The 
competition for national conventions is very strong and there 
are many cities that consistently fail to fill their convention 
centers.  The most recent example of this is Boston, which 
recently built the $850 million Boston Convention and 
Exhibition Center.151  Prior to construction, Boston released a 
feasibility study that predicted the center would book thirty-
four conventions each year.152  There have only been forty-three 
confirmed bookings through 2010, an average of less than ten 
  
 145 Horowitz, supra note 14 
 146 ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS, supra note 134, at 2. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 2. 
 150 See Heywood T. Sanders, Flawed Forecasts: A Critical Look at Convention 
Center Feasibility Studies, 1999 Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research, White 
Paper No. 9, available at http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/wp9.pdf (last visited Oct. 
8, 2005). 
 151 Big Claims And Questions Surround Plan For a Stadium, supra note 137. 
 152 Id. 
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bookings per year.153  Similar attendance figures in New York 
City would have proven detrimental to its ability to service the 
massive debt associated with building the NYSCC.   
The Edward Jones Dome and America’s Center (“the 
Dome”) in St. Louis is considered the most successful 
stadium/exhibition hall in the country and the Jets’ study cited 
it as a comparable facility to the proposed NYSCC.154  In 2003, 
the Dome hosted only eight non-sports related events, and 
those were low-impact events that drew local residents but did 
not generate hotel and restaurant taxes.155   These eight events 
come nowhere close the thirty-eight non-sports events that the 
Jets’ study based its revenue projections upon.156  Seeing as 
how, unlike the Dome, the NYSCC would have lacked 
continuous floor space between the stadium and the convention 
center since they would be connected by a 100-yard long 
corridor, convention planners may have been further deterred 
from bringing large shows.157  It is hard to believe that the 
NYSCC would have been filled thirty-eight times a year with 
conventions, when less expensive cities such as St. Louis and 
Boston are having trouble filling their convention centers ten 
times a year. 
Under the IBO’s optimistic projections, the NYSCC 
would have been used for twenty expositions, two plenary 
sessions and two mega-events158 each year.159  This amounted to 
a projected $28.4 million in city tax revenues and $24.9 million 
in new state revenue, meaning that the city tax revenues would 
have been $6.7 million and the state tax revenue would have 
been $11.9 million less than the proponents of the plan 
estimated.160  While these independent figures would have still 
  
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4, at 5. 
 157 REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 29.  Also of note is the fact 
that the Dome in St. Louis was built in 1995 for $260 million, or $330 million in 2004 
dollars, while the NYSCC would have cost at least $1.4 billion.  Walter Mankoff, How 
Will The Proposed West Side Stadium Complex Impact Our City? Statement on Behalf 
of Manhattan Community Board No.4, Testimony Before the New York City Council 
(June 3, 2004) available at http://www.manhattancb4.org/HKHY/docs/ 
WS%20Stadium%20hearing.htm. 
 158 “Mega events are large national events staged in the arena or stadium 
configuration.  Examples of potential mega events are the National College Athletic 
Association Final Four basketball tournament, college football games, and large scale 
concerts.”  ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS, supra note 134, at 3. 
 159 TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 2. 
 160 ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS, supra note 134, at 8, 10. 
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allowed the city and state to cover the debt service on the West 
Side Stadium, the margin for error would have been much 
narrower than the Jets’ study indicated.161  Since the IBO 
analysis was based on an optimistic number of exposition 
events, the revenues generated by the non-Jets stadium events 
could quite possibly not have covered the enormous debt, 
leaving the taxpayers to cover the rest.162  This sizeable risk to 
the taxpayers, in conjunction with the limited risk to the Jets, 
demonstrates that the public benefits of this stadium plan were 
highly speculative while the private benefit to the team was 
enormous and clear. 
Job creation predictions are another figure that the 
proponents of publicly funded stadium and convention center 
construction consistently rely on for support.  Studies on the 
reliability of these predictions have shown, as in the context of 
revenues, that post-stadium construction job creation figures 
rarely meet expectations.163  The Jets’ study predicted that the 
project would create 6,971 jobs.164  The IBO determined that 
even under an optimistic scenario, the facility would generate 
only about half of that figure, or 3,586 jobs.165  Using these 
more realistic figures, the IBO predicted that the new jobs 
created by the NYSCC would generate $144 million in new 
earnings, while the Jets’ study predicted $284 in earnings.166  
As with the IBO’s revenue predictions, these job figures were 
under an optimistic scenario of twenty convention style events 
each year.167  If there were fewer than twenty conventions, the 
job numbers would fall along with the revenues.  Also, since 
twenty percent of the jobs would most likely have been held by 
residents not living in one of the five boroughs of New York 
City, only $86 million of the $144 million optimistically 
predicted new earnings would have benefited residents of the 
  
 161 Id. at 1. 
 162 “If the facility only hosted the expected 17 football games per year with no 
other events, the total city tax revenues would be $9.2 million.”  ESTIMATING THE 
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS, supra note 134, at 8.   
 163 See Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of 
Teams and Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES 92, supra note 15, at 93-99; 
TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that estimating demand for 
convention center space is highly speculative). 
 164 TOUCHDOWN FOR THE CITY?, supra note 24, at 3. 
 165 Id. at 1. 
 166 Id. at 3. 
 167 Id. at 2. 
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city called upon to foot $300 million of the bill for the 
stadium.168   
Aside from the strong likelihood that the actual number 
of jobs that would have been created by the construction and 
maintenance of the West Side Stadium would have fallen far 
short of the proponents’ predictions, the jobs created by the 
West Side Stadium would mostly have been of the low-paying 
service variety or not new jobs at all.169  The construction 
unions were one of the major supporters of the plan because of 
the construction jobs associated with it.170  The jobs involved in 
the construction of stadiums, however, only represent new 
earnings if those construction workers would be out of work 
otherwise.171  Additionally, the options for the West Side were 
not between a stadium and an open rail yard.  Those who 
opposed the stadium favored building commercial, residential, 
and open spaces on the site, just not a publicly subsidized 
football stadium for the Jets.172  If apartment buildings, office 
complexes, or anything else were built on at that spot instead 
of a stadium, construction workers would still have been in 
high demand. 
There were additional financial risks to the public if the 
NYSCC was financed and constructed as planned, not the least 
of which was the burden to the MTA.  The MTA is the cash-
strapped state agency that currently owns the rail yards that 
the Jets planned to build above.173  Over the past few years, the 
MTA has been raising its tolls and fares and cutting services to 
counteract a ballooning deficit that may soon reach $1.2 
billion.174  There was widespread concern that the stadium 
financing strategy, which only offered the MTA $100 million for 
  
 168 Id. at 3.  
 169 Id.; Baade & Sanderson, supra note 163, at 94, 112. 
 170 See Natalie Keith, J-E-T-S Equals J-O-B-S: $2.8 Billion Stadium and 
Convention Center Plan Will Bring Construction Jobs, NEW YORK CONSTRUCTION (July 
2004), available at 
http://newyork.construction.com/features/archive/0407_feature1.asp. 
 171 See Baade & Sanderson, supra note 163, at 94, 112. 
 172 See, e.g., REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE HUDSON RAIL YARDS (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.rpa.org/pdf/hudsonyardsalternatives.pdf. 
 173 For a detailed analysis of the MTA’s economic troubles and future 
prospects, see NEW YORK CITY INDEPENDENT BUDGET OFFICE, RUNNING ON EMPTY: 
THE MTA’S 2005 BUDGET AND FINANCIAL PLAN (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter RUNNING ON 
EMPTY], available at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us. 
 174 Id. at 1.  See also Joshua Robin, Layoffs on the Line: Transit Union Vows to 
Fight Plan to Terminate at Least 1,200 Subway, Bus Workers; Alternative Would Raise 
Monthly MetroCard Fare Even Higher, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 2004, at A3. 
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the air rights above the Hudson Yards, would deprive this 
already struggling state agency of the market value of its 
asset.175  The MTA’s financial struggles have significantly 
increased costs for the public, especially commuters.176  If tax 
dollars were spent to compensate for the air rights above the 
Hudson Yards in an inefficient manner that benefited the Jets 
more than the MTA, the costs of this project would have been 
further exacerbated to the detriment of New Yorkers’ wallets. 
Demonstrating that the Jets planned on depriving the 
MTA of the fair value of the air rights above the rail yards, in 
February of 2005, Cablevision, the biggest opponent of the 
West Side Stadium plan, offered to pay $600 million for the 
right to build office buildings and housing over the Hudson 
Yards.177  This bid, $500 million more than what the Jets were 
offering, also covered the cost of the platform that the stadium 
plan required state and city taxes to pay for.178  A bidding war 
ensued between the Jets, Cablevision, and other prospective 
developers.179  The MTA eventually accepted the Jets’ $715 
million bid even though Cablevision’s bid was $760 million.180  
Cablevision brought suit against the MTA in state court 
alleging that “the MTA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
selecting the Jets’ bid.”181  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the MTA, holding that, “[i]n assessing which terms are most 
beneficial, the MTA can take into account not only the dollar 
figure being offered, but the long-term benefit to the MTA and 
  
 175 See REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 31-32 (“Compensation 
to the MTA for these [development] rights does not appear as a major cost assumption 
in the plan, in spite of the potential value of these development rights.”). 
 176 RUNNING ON EMPTY, supra note 173, at 6-7.  For reports on public 
transportation fare increases in New York City, see The New York Public Interest 
Research Group’s Straphangers Campaign, http://www.straphangers.org/farehike1004/ 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
 177 See Charles V. Bagli, Owner of Garden Outbids Jets For Site of Proposed 
Stadium, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at A1. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Charles V. Bagli, Jets and Rivals Increase Bids For Railyards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005 at A1. 
 180 The Jets’ proposal included a $250 million payment over four years or a 
discounted up front payment of $210 million, a $25 million slush fund for repairs, and 
approximately $440 million from real estate developers.  The Cablevision bid (referred 
to by the court as the MSG proposal) provided for $400 million up front and a 
commitment to build the $360 million platform over the rail yards.  See In re Madison 
Square Garden, L.P., 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50824U, ***7-9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2005) 
aff’d 799 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005).   
 181 Id. at ***13. 
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the public it serves.”182  Unfortunately for the Jets, days after 
this decision was handed down, their West Side Stadium 
aspirations were ended by the PACB’s veto.183 
B. Insufficient Opportunity for the New York Legislatures 
and the Public to Review and Offer Alternatives to the 
Stadium Plan 
In addition to the incredible financial risks to the public 
associated with the West Side Stadium, the opponents of its 
construction had many other reasons to complain.  First of all, 
the city and state legislatures had minimal opportunities for 
review of the plan.  The proponents of the project responded by 
pointing out that the City Council could approve the zoning 
necessary for the Hudson Yards plan and that the city and 
state development corporations also had to approve the NYSCC 
plan.184  These are insufficient means for public review.  
According to the Regional Plan Association (RPA), an 
independent community planning organization, “[the] RPA 
remains concerned that the project is not being given adequate 
review and that normal processes are being truncated.  The 
review process designed for land use decisions should not be 
used as a proxy for informed debate on financing.”185  
Community leaders on the West Side shared the RPA’s 
sentiment and felt that direct public review of the stadium plan 
needed to be implemented before constructing such a huge 
structure.186   
The RPA published a report containing three 
alternative plans for the development of the West Side, which 
suggested that mixed-use development rather than a stadium 
would provide a greater revenue stream for New York City.187  
This report attacked the faulty underlying assumption by the 
proponents of the plan that “the public’s choice is between a 
  
 182 Id. at ***12 (citing Creole Enterprises, Inc. v. Giuliani, 236 A.D.2d 272 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1997); New City Jewish Center v. Flagg, 111 A.D.2d 814 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2nd Dep’t 1985), aff’d 489 N.E.2d 1297 (N.Y. 1985)). 
 183 See Bloomberg’s Stadium Quest Fails, supra note 3. 
 184 REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 32. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Letter from Manhattan Community Board No. 4 to Amanda Burden, Chair 
of the City Planning Commission 12 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from 
Manhattan Community Bd. No. 4], available at http://www.manhattancb4.org/agendas/ 
2004_08/1%20HY%20ULURP%20Response%20final.pdf. 
 187 REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 172. 
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stadium and the exposed rail yard.”188  The mixed-use 
development envisioned by the RPA and other groups 
interested in the development of the Far West Side included 
construction of condominiums, rental apartments, and 
commercial office buildings.189  Since these alternatives would 
have involved dramatically fewer infrastructure costs,190 the 
projected net revenues of a mixed-use development would have 
been $510 million in comparison to only $74 million for a 
stadium.191  While the proponents of the stadium argued that 
the public would benefit from the projected revenues of the 
West Side Stadium, there was insufficient consideration of 
alternative uses of that land that could provide more secure 
and greater benefits to the public.   
The people of New York also did not get an opportunity 
to vote on whether or not they desire a stadium to be built on 
the West Side.192  This is because New York is not among the 
twenty-seven states that require a vote by the electorate prior 
to the issuance of municipal debt.193  It cannot be known 
whether the voters of New York would approve a measure to 
finance the NYSCC without actually holding a vote.  Thus, the 
decision to use $600 million in public funds for a football 
stadium was in the hands of a few powerful individuals, rather 
than in the hands of the people who would have paid for it.  
Like the Robert Moses projects of the twentieth century, the 
citizens of New York City had a disturbingly limited ability to 
stop or alter the plan to build this massive stadium by 
exercising their voting rights.194   
  
 188 Id. at 2. 
 189 Id. at 3. 
 190 The RPA mixed-use alternative would still require that a platform be built 
over the rail yards, but not $225 million for a retractable roof.  Also, this type of 
development would require developers to pay fees and property taxes that the Jets 
would not have paid.  Id. at 4. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, supra note 91, at 32. 
 193 Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 365, 370 n.10. 
 194 While the New York City officials pushing for the construction of the West 
Side Stadium did not plan to subject this issue to a public vote at all, other 
municipalities have even gone ahead and financed stadiums that were voted down on 
ballot measures. See, e.g., Long v. Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172, 176-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2002); CLEAN v. State, 928 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Wash. 1996).  See also, Rodney Fort, 
Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES 146, supra note 15. 
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C. The Significant Social Costs of Committing Such a 
Large Sum of Public Funds to a Stadium 
The opponents of this stadium plan also argued that 
New York City is facing serious social crises that are not being 
adequately addressed, which would only have worsened if tax 
dollars were diverted towards the risky NYSCC plan.195  These 
opponents felt that public schools, police and fire protection, 
and affordable housing should be primary concerns, not 
secondary to stadium construction.196  They also were concerned 
that the traffic that already makes travel on the West Side 
exceedingly difficult would worsen exponentially with the 
construction and operation of a football stadium.  According to 
the New York City Council Member for the district where the 
stadium would have been built, “[t]he simultaneous arrival and 
departure of 80,000 people [would] devastate already-clogged 
streets and transit lines, even with a subway extension.”197   
While the opponents of publicly financed stadiums won 
a major victory when the plan to build the NYSCC was vetoed 
by Assemblyman Silver and Senator Bruno, they cannot rest on 
their laurels.  Taxpayers, politicians, and community groups 
opposed to publicly financed stadiums still have the weight of 
the national trend of approving these stadium plans working 
against them.  It is probable that lawsuits challenging the use 
of public money will arise in response to the plan to build new 
facilities for the Mets, Yankees, and Nets.  The courts, when 
hearing challenges to these subsidized stadium plans, must not 
allow the practice of avoiding or ignoring public sentiment 
when spending hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars to 
become the standard in New York.198  The next part will discuss 
the public purpose doctrine and its potential as a litigation tool 
for invalidating plans to use public funds to construct stadiums 
that will primarily benefit the team that plays there.   
  
 195 Letter from Manhattan Community Bd. No. 4, supra note 186, at 9. 
 196 Id.  
 197 Council Member Christine Quinn in Testimony Prepared by Ana Hayes 
Levin of Manhattan Community Bd. No. 4 for delivery at the Joint Meeting of City 
Council Committees on Land Use and Economic Development (April 28, 2003) (on file 
with author).   
 198 See infra Parts IV.B and V for a discussion of the role of the New York 
judiciary in taxpayer challenges to the stadium proposal. 
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IV. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE:  CAN IT BE AN 
EFFECTIVE TOOL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST PUBLICLY 
FINANCED STADIUMS? 
Whether discussing the use of tax-exempt bonds to 
finance the construction of a professional sports facility in 
terms of the debt incurred by the local and state governments 
or the loss of federal tax revenues, the issue is basically the 
same:  do stadiums provide a significant benefit to the public 
that warrants massive subsidies?  The public purpose doctrine, 
as it is commonly referred to, has been incorporated into nearly 
every state constitution in order to ensure that taxpayer 
dollars are being spent on projects that benefit the public, not 
private individuals and corporations.199   
A. The Evolution of the Public Purpose Doctrine 
The public purpose doctrine was originally designed by 
state legislatures to curb corruption and exploitation of the 
public by legislators and railroad developers during the late 
1800s.200  The public concern during that period was that tax 
dollars were being designated to repay bonds issued for the 
private benefit of railroad owners.201  Today, taxpayers 
throughout the nation continue to call upon the public purpose 
doctrine in lawsuits challenging the use of public funds to 
repay bonds issues to pay for the construction and renovation 
of stadiums.202  In the majority of these lawsuits, courts have 
found that the expenditure of taxpayer dollars for sports 
  
 199 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. arts. VII, § 8, VIII, § 1.  For a description of the 
evolution of the public purpose doctrine, see Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional 
Sports Teams—A Constitutional Disgrace. The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and 
State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 
30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393 (1999).   
 200 Rubin, supra note 199, at 396-398. 
 201 Id. at 397. 
 202 See, e.g., Long v. Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172, 178 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); 
Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill. 2003); Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 530 A.2d 245, 246 (Md. 1987); Allegheny Institute 
Taxpayers Coalition v. Allegheny Regional Asset Dist., 727 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999); 
Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 806 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Libertarian 
Party of Wisconsin v. State, 546 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Wis. 1996); CLEAN v. State, 928 
P.2d 1054, 1056 (Wash. 1996).   
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facilities fulfilled a public purpose even though private 
corporations would receive a substantial benefit as a result.203 
One of the first taxpayer lawsuits challenging public 
funding for a stadium under the public purpose doctrine was 
Meyer v. City of Cleveland.204  Meyer, a Cleveland taxpayer, 
sued on behalf of the city and sought to enjoin the issuance of 
$2,500,000 in bonds for the construction of “a fireproof stadium 
on the lake front.”205  He argued that the true purpose of the 
stadium was for use by the Cleveland Indians baseball club, a 
primarily private use that should not be publicly funded under 
the public purpose doctrine.206  The court, in rejecting the 
taxpayer’s argument, pointed to the public entertainment and 
educational purposes that a stadium could provide, such as 
carnivals, theatric performances, and concerts.207  The court 
stated that cities are “not limited to policing the city, to paving 
the streets, to providing it with light, water, sewers, docks, and 
markets” and that “[t]he power of cities and towns to maintain 
institutions which educate and instruct as well as please and 
amuse their inhabitants . . . is unquestioned.”208  In regards to 
the Cleveland Indians’ use of the stadium, the court said that, 
“where buildings of that character are owned by the city there 
can certainly be no objection to the city deriving revenue 
therefrom.”209 
After the Meyer decision, many other municipalities 
began utilizing public funds for new stadiums.210  As more cities 
began to plan publicly financed stadiums, more taxpayers arose 
to challenge them.  In the 1960s, taxpayer lawsuits challenging 
public expenditures for sports facilities were defeated in 
Philadelphia,211 Cincinnati,212 and Denver.213  In each of those 
  
 203 “Modern courts . . . have so broadened the scope of the doctrine so as to 
render it ineffective as a tool to limit the power of the public entity to spend tax 
dollars.”  Rubin, supra note 199, at 418.   
 204 171 N.E. 606 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930). 
 205 Id. at 606. 
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 207 Id.  
 208 Id. at 606-607. 
 209 Id. at 608. 
 210 Adams, supra note 23, at 664.  
 211 Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894 (Pa. 1966).  The court went 
further than the Meyer court in holding that:  
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events or leasing buildings (which might be a private, not a public, use), but 
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cases, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the city was 
committing a violation of the state constitution by failing to 
follow to the public purpose doctrine.214  The courts adhered to 
the broad definition of public use in Meyer and deferred to the 
state legislature to determine whether the public benefit of a 
stadium outweighs the private benefit to the team that would 
play there.215 The trend towards allowing municipalities to 
classify a stadium as a public purpose, which began with Meyer 
in 1930, has continued to pervade in many large American 
cities practically undeterred.216 
Two state courts in the 1960s, however, did invalidate 
publicly funded stadium plans.217  In 1966, the Supreme Court 
of Florida upheld a taxpayer challenge to the issuance of $1.5 
million in bonds to pay for a spring training stadium for the 
Pittsburgh Pirates.218  In Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach the 
court held that the bond issuance would violate the Florida 
State Constitution’s public purpose provisions, which forbid 
municipalities from assessing taxes for non-municipal purposes 
and from extending public credit to any private entity.219  The 
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court stated that although the presence of a private interest 
does not per se violate the public purpose requirement, “[t]he 
mere incidental advantage to the public resulting from a public 
aid in the promotion of private enterprise is not a public or 
municipal purpose.”220 
In 1969, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
in an advisory opinion, held that a plan to use public funds to 
construct a multi-use stadium in Boston did not meet the 
public purpose requirement of the state constitution.221  While 
recognizing that stadiums do provide certain public benefits, 
the court determined that the stadium proposal contained 
insufficient safeguards to protect the public interest from the 
“improper diversion of public funds and privileges for the 
benefit of private persons and entities.”222  As a result of this 
decision, recently proposed stadium acts requesting public 
funds in Massachusetts include safeguards that limit the 
amount of public money that may be spent and guarantee 
specific returns on public investments.223  In contrast, the plan 
to finance the West Side Stadium included neither of these 
safeguards.224 
In the early 1970s, the courts of New York State were 
confronted with a taxpayer challenge to a stadium funding 
plan.  In Murphy v. Erie County, 225 the plaintiff taxpayers sued 
to prevent Erie County from issuing $50,000,000 in bonds to 
finance a new domed stadium to be leased for 40 years to a 
private entity.226  The plaintiffs claimed that the lease would 
violate Article VIII of the New York Constitution, which forbids 
a loan or gift of county property in aid of a private 
undertaking.227  The Court of Appeals held that the private 
benefit would be “incidental” to the public purpose of the 
  
Article IX, Section 5, of the Constitution, provides that ‘The Legislature shall 
authorize . . . incorporated cities . . . to assess and improve taxes . . . for 
municipal purposes, and for no other purposes. . . .’; and Article IX, Section 
10, of the Constitution prescribes that ‘The Legislature shall not authorize 
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Id. at 11 (quoting FLA. CONST. art IX, §§ 5, 10).  
 220 Id. at 12. 
 221 Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d at 560. 
 222 Id. at 558-60. 
 223 Adams, supra note 23, at 685-87. 
 224 See generally GENERAL PROJECT PLAN, supra note 4. 
 225 268 N.E.2d 771 (N.Y. 1971).   
 226 Id. at 772. 
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stadium.228  The court also reiterated the holding of Martin v. 
Philadelphia by stating that, “[i]t is established that a 
municipality may lease its public improvements to private 
concerns so long as the benefit accrues to the public and the 
municipality retains ownership of the improvement.”229  This 
case is in line with many states’ sentiment towards stadium 
finance.230  
More recently, the Supreme Court of Florida broadened 
the public purpose doctrine in Poe v. Hillsborough County.231  In 
that case, a taxpayer sued to invalidate the bond issued to fund 
the construction of a stadium for the Tampa Bay Buccaneers 
under that state’s public purpose provision.232  The court upheld 
the issuance of the bond as fulfilling a public purpose.233  The 
public purposes that the court believed the stadium would 
provide included the anticipated economic benefits projected by 
the city as well as “national media exposure” and the “civic 
pride and camaraderie” associated with having a professional 
football team play in the city.234  This case provides an excellent 
example of the great deference given by state courts to the 
municipalities that wish to expend tax dollars to build sports 
facilities.  Today, even speculative and unquantifiable benefits 
to the public will be sufficient in many jurisdictions to 
demonstrate that there is a public purpose that justifies 
massive public subsidies of stadiums.235  
One of the most recent examples of a public purpose 
challenge to a taxpayer financed NFL stadium project took 
place in Chicago.  In Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park 
District,236 a non-profit organization seeking to protect Soldier 
Field from being altered at the public’s expense challenged a 
plan to issue $399,000,000 in bonds to reconstruct the stadium 
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and erect a parking garage.237  They claimed that this issuance 
of debt disproportionately favored the Bears NFL franchise, 
thus violating the section of the Illinois Constitution that 
forbids public funds from being used for private purposes.238  In 
line with the national trend, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
deferred to the legislature to determine what constitutes a 
public purpose.239  The court stated that: 
[i]t is historically clear that Soldier Field has served public purposes 
since its dedication in 1924. It will continue to do so after the 
completion of the Burnham Park project as authorized by the Act.  A 
financial benefit accruing to the Bears, standing alone, does not 
diminish the fact that the renovated Soldier Field will be used and 
enjoyed by the public for a wide variety of public purposes, whether 
or not the projected positive effects on jobs and the local economy 
generally result as predicted by the legislature.240 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Friends of the Parks, like 
the court in Poe, took an expansive view of the concept of public 
benefit.  By making findings of public benefit that may turn out 
to be false, the legislature was able to shift the burden of 
proving that the project would primarily benefit a private 
entity to their opponents.241 
Due to the nationwide broadening of the public purpose 
doctrine from the 1930s to the present, non-profit organizations 
and individual taxpayers in New York City would have had 
their work cut out for them if they wished to challenge the 
bond issuances for the West Side Stadium as solely 
representing a handout to the Jets.242  As described above, 
stadium opponents could have made compelling arguments 
demonstrating that the public benefit of a West Side Stadium, 
if any existed, was merely incidental to the massive private 
  
 237 Id. at 162-164. 
 238 Id. at 165. 
 239 Id. at 166-167. 
 240 Id. at 169. 
 241 See id. 
 242 See Rubin, supra note 199, at 418. 
In light of the courts’ pervasive unwillingness to place any limitations on 
what the state and its political subdivisions can do with tax dollars, the 
public finds itself in the same position as it was more than 150 years ago. . . .  
Unless the courts begin to fulfill their judicial responsibility and properly 
enforce the constitution, the public will be left to the mercies of a legislature 
prone to side with the entity that pays the most money.  The future does not 
look bright. 
Id. 
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benefit to the Jets.243  If such arguments were made in state 
court, the court should have deemed the NYSCC bond issuance 
proposals unconstitutional under Articles VII and VIII of the 
New York State Constitution, New York’s public purpose 
provisions for the investment of state and local funds.244  While 
such a challenge to the West Side Stadium ended up being 
unnecessary after the PACB vetoed the plan, opponents of 
publicly financed stadiums should be preparing their 
arguments for a narrow reading of the public purpose 
provisions now so they can effectively fight the stadium 
financing plans for New York City’s other sports franchises. 
B. Why Challenges to the NYSCC Under the Public Purpose 
Doctrine Could Have Succeeded 
It is inequitable to force the taxpayers of New York to 
assume the monumental risks associated with stadium projects 
of the magnitude of the West Side Stadium without first asking 
them if they agree that the government should go ahead and 
fund that stadium.  Many New Yorkers, including officials 
elected to serve the interests of the public, feel that the 
taxpayers should not be forced by franchise owners and a 
handful of powerful city officials to subsidize stadiums when it 
is not in their best interest.245  The plan to construct the West 
Side Stadium would not have been voted upon by the City’s 
legislature or its citizenry.  There is no plan to allow people of 
New York City or their local legislators to vote on the funding 
of the new Mets, Yankees, or Nets sports facilities either.  
Therefore, stadium opponents will likely have to turn to the 
courts in order to stop public funds from being used to finance 
these projects.   
Taxpayers around the nation have been forced by 
municipalities to fund stadiums by assuming debt and 
forfeiting tax revenues from sports teams.246  With the aid of 
state courts that have proven exceedingly deferential to the 
proponents of public funding for stadiums, the United States 
has been experiencing a stadium construction boom for nearly 
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forty years.247  During this period, the public purpose doctrine’s 
ability to protect taxpayers from funding private benefits has 
been steadily diminishing in most jurisdictions.248  In the near 
future the courts of New York will be presented with an 
excellent opportunity to put a resounding halt to this practice 
by upholding challenges seeking to enjoin the expenditure of 
hundreds of millions of city and state dollars for stadiums. 
Taxpayer challenges to the NYSCC would have needed 
to overcome the widespread national trend of approving these 
public finance schemes as well as the Murphy case, which 
recognized a public purpose in sports facilities.249  The courts of 
New York, if faced with a taxpayer challenge to the NYSCC 
should have looked to the independent analysis of this plan 
indicating that the City and the Jets were relying on an 
inaccurate study that overestimated the community growth, 
jobs, and revenues that this stadium would create.250  The 
courts should also have looked to the fates of several other 
cities that have committed huge amounts of tax dollars to 
stadiums and convention centers that have failed to come close 
to meeting expectations.251  With the opportunity to hear 
taxpayer suits against the West Side Stadium, the state courts 
could have breathed life back into New York’s public purpose 
provisions by holding that a massive private benefit from 
enormous tax dollar expenditures cannot be overridden by 
speculative and risky plans to derive a public benefit 
propounded by the same private entities that would see the 
greatest benefit.  
When hearing upcoming stadium challenges, New York 
courts should consider the fact that the public has been 
afforded no opportunity to vote on whether the stadium should 
be built.252  The court in Poe deferred to the unsubstantiated 
and speculative benefits to the public that were presented by 
the respective municipalities.253  While the plaintiffs in that 
case had valid arguments that their taxes were being used to 
benefit a private corporation in violation of the Florida State 
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Constitution, the majority of taxpayers voted to approve the 
stadium financing scheme when it was presented to them on 
the ballot.254  A court can more easily justify the expenditure of 
taxpayer dollars for a controversial purpose when the 
taxpayers themselves have voted in agreement with the 
municipality to spend in that way.  New York citizens are not 
being offered a similar opportunity to vote on upcoming 
stadium projects.255  While a ballot measure or referendum is 
not required for all proposed expenditures of tax dollars, 
decisions to assume hundreds of millions in debt to fund 
stadiums that will immensely benefit private corporations 
must not be made by a handful of politicians and developers. 
Similarly, the legislature elected by the people of New 
York City will not have been given direct authority to approve 
or deny funding for these projects.256  The Supreme Court of 
Illinois in Friends of the Parks deferred to the legislative 
findings of prospective public benefits when approving a large 
bond issuance to renovate Soldier Field.257  Again, the court 
rejected valid taxpayer arguments that public funds were 
disproportionately benefiting a privately owned corporation.258  
However, the taxpayers of Chicago at least had a body of 
elected officials with political accountability researching and 
weighing the prospective public harms and benefits of that tax-
free stadium bond issuance.259  The New York City Council had 
no direct authority to decide on the NYSCC plan and will have 
no authority to approve the Yankees, Mets, or Nets proposals 
either.260  The courts of New York must not defer to flawed 
studies done for the very private corporation that stands to 
benefit from a stadium, which was the case with the Jets’ 
plan.261  Without voter or legislative approval, the public 
purpose requirement cannot be met because the public has had 
no constructive opportunity to weigh in. 
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C. Applying the Massachusetts Approach in Future New 
York Stadium Challenges  
The courts of New York should follow the lead of 
Massachusetts in regards to the public purpose doctrine and 
look much more carefully at who will primarily benefit from a 
publicly financed stadium.  In Opinion of the Justices, the 
judiciary of Massachusetts firmly established that the public’s 
money cannot be improperly diverted in order to benefit a 
private entity.262  Although the case was decided long ago, this 
holding remains good law today and was recently applied in 
order to invalidate the plan to build a minor league baseball 
stadium in City of Springfield v. Dreison.263  In Dreison, the 
court determined that the private use of the stadium 
superceded its public use and held that the state could not 
exercise its eminent domain power in order to foster the 
stadium construction.264  The Superior Court of Massachusetts 
said:  
[W]here it is contemplated that a stadium will be used primarily or 
substantially by a privately owned professional athletic team, 
statutory controls must be in place before public funds can be used to 
acquire or build such a stadium.  That is exactly the type of stadium 
at issue here.  The principal immediate reason for the proposed 
stadium in this case is to allow a private not-for-profit corporation to 
own and operate a professional baseball team.265 
The controversy over the plan to fund the NYSCC was 
quite similar to the one discussed in Dreison even though 
eminent domain was not a central issue.  This is because, as 
evidenced by the aforementioned guaranteed profits to the Jets 
and the risks to the public, the principal reason for this project 
was for the Jets to own and operate the stadium.  Subsidized 
stadium opponents should be figuring out how to demonstrate 
that the plans to build new homes for the Mets, Yankees, and 
Nets are also primarily private enterprises 
As discussed above, there were no safeguards protecting 
the potential public investment in the West Side Stadium, and 
there was a substantial risk that the revenues generated would 
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be insufficient to service the $600 million in bonds.266  The fact 
that some public benefits may have resulted from the stadium 
cannot override the fact that the Jets were guaranteed profits 
and the public was guaranteed nothing.267  If proposed in 
Massachusetts, the plan to fund the West Side Stadium would 
have been invalidated under that state’s version of the public 
purpose doctrine.268  The courts of New York should adopt a 
similar interpretation of the public purpose doctrine and begin 
to invalidate publicly subsidized stadiums as well. 
In Murphy v. Erie County, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a publicly funded stadium utilized for the 
benefit of a private corporation fulfilled a public purpose and 
did not necessarily represent a gift of public property to a 
private entity.269  The court stated that in regards to the 
stadium at issue, “the private benefit is ‘incidental’ to the 
conceded public purpose of the stadium.”270  This view is 
erroneous.  The immense costs and risks of the West Side 
Stadium plan in conjunction with the nearly certain profits for 
the Jets were not what the creators of the public purpose 
doctrine envisioned.  The public benefits, if any, of stadiums 
and arenas are incidental to private purposes, and for this 
reason stadiums should not be funded using tax dollars.271 
V. CONCLUSION 
With several publicly financed stadiums in the works in 
New York City, the time will soon come for the courts to make 
a decision on whether to allow wealthy sports franchises to 
receive immense public subsidies to construct these privately 
owned facilities.  When that time comes, those courts should 
depart from the national trend and hold that these massive 
public subsidies violate the public purpose provisions of the 
New York State Constitution.  An extreme example of why it is 
inequitable for taxpayers to bear the risk and costs of helping 
to pay for sports stadiums was the recent plan to construct the 
NYSCC.  While the private interests of the Jets would 
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definitely have been served by the West Side Stadium, the 
benefit to the public was far too speculative.  The use of public 
dollars for stadiums absent valid demonstration of a 
substantial public benefit should cease to be the norm.  Future 
taxpayer lawsuits will allow the perfect opportunity for New 
York to put its foot down and end the widespread stadium 
handouts to sports franchises. 
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